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"Projectification" of the Firm, 
 
the Renault Case2 
  
Christophe Midler 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Many industrial firms are implementing fundamental changes in their organizations to 
increase the efficiency of their product development processes. Here we focus on the 
relations between project management models and the permanent organization and processes 
of the firm. 
The case of the French firm Renault is being studied. This firm implemented a transition, 
from a classical funtional organization in the 1960's to project coordination in the 1970's and 
autonomous and powerful project teams since 1989. Such advanced project management has 
deep and destabilising effects on the other permanent logics of the firm (task definitions, 
hierarchic regulations, carrier management, functions and suppliers relationship). Therefore a 
phase of "projectification" is now under way to adapt these permanent processes to the new 
context.   
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Project Management and Evolution of the Permanent Organization of the Firm  
 
 
Many companies in the Western world are currently implementing far-reaching reforms of 
their management systems for new products. This trend is affecting different sectors (Clark et 
al 1992, Giard and Midler 1993) and in it can be seen the effects of a shift from the 
competitive modes of a mass-market economy to those of an economy typified by variety or 
reactive adaptability. In this type of context the competitive edge of any company depends 
firstly on its capacity to market genuinely innovative products rapidly and at satisfactory 
levels of quality and pricing — and secondly on targeting them at specific market niches, 
with the aim of outmoding more ordinary products (Dertouzos et al 1990; Stalk and Hout, 
1990; Cohendet and Lléréna 1992; Coriat and Taddéi 1993). The combination of these 
strategies multiplies the number of projects to be managed. 
The automobile sector demonstrates a particularly good example of the trend (Clark and 
Fujimoto 1991, Midler 1993a). It typified mass-market industry up to the 1960s, and is now 
at the forefront of the developments in concurrent engineering and integrated project teams. 
 
We will focus our analysis of such transitions on the relations between the temporary project 
organizations and practices on one side, and the permanent organizations and processes of the 
firm on the other. Galbraith (1971) analysed the range of alternatives between a functional 
organization and a product (or project) organization, the median situation being the matrix 
organization. Focus was there essentially on formal organizational patterns. More recent 
works in organizations give more precise and varied models for the permanent coordination 
processes within the firms (see Mintzberg 1979). Comparative research between American 
and Japaneese firms demonstrate the influence of such characteristics of permanent 
coordination processes on the project practices and efficiency (Aoki 1990, Clark et al 1987, 
Clark and Fujimoto 1991). Navarre (1993, p 181, 215) formalised the relation between the 
project management paradigm and the characterization of the firm: The classical north 
American project management paradigm is related to a vertical type of firm as the modern 
concurrent and integrated approches are related to a horizontal type of organizations. This 
research domain is actually growing, and it is also appearing under new labels as 
"management by projects" or the "Project-oriented Company" (Gareis 1989). 
 
We aspire here to make an empirical contribution to such an analysis of relations between 
project management and firm organization. The article contains a case study, the 
"projectification" of the French firm Renault, during a four phase transition from the 1960s to 
ongoing evolutions. We will try to associate a political approach of the change (what is the 
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power and the autonomy of project teams within the firm ?) with a learning perspective 
(Argyris and Schön, 1978). 
 
The account is based on longitudinal research which associates different methodologies: 
historical analysis, ex-post project diagnostics in the 1980's and real-time analysis of Renault 
Twingo project from 1989 to 1993 (Midler 1993a). 
 
 
First Phase: Functional Organization and Informal Project Coordination in the 1960's 
 
 
In the 1960's, Renault had a typical functional organization. It was divided, as shown in 
figure 1, into powerful, compartmentalized skill-based departments: engineering design, 
methods, production and so forth. No direct link existed between the operational divisions.  
Departmental 
Departmental 
project players
Contributors from 
outside the company 
(industrial market 
partners)
  
management
 
Figure 1 : The Functional Structure 
 (adapted from Clark, Hayes and Wheelwright, 1988) 
 
Therefore, in the 1960s there was a time of informal project coordination [artisanat projet in 
French as used by Pierre Dreyfus, Renault CEO (Dreyfus, 1977)]. Each project was managed 
on a case-by-case basis. The only person who linked and arbitrated between them was the 
CEO himself. This approach was suited to the manufacture of few non-diversified products 
but by the 1970s it was no longer capable of dealing with the growth of products in terms of 
number and complexity . 
 
 
Second Phase: Centralized Project Coordination from 1970 to 1988. 
 
 
The beginning of 1970 marked a first important evolution in new product development 
management. Project management and marketing experts were recruited, especially from 
American firms which had already experimented with these techniques. Organizational 
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structures cutting horizontally across the corporation were set up as seen in figure 2, 
involving the heads of the various operational divisions. These met in committees to look at 
the project-related problems. Apart from these committees, communication remained 
essentially vertical, between the top and the bottom of each functional department. Project 
coordinators were appointed: these were people whose corporate status was fairly low and 
whose competence was not yet fully confirmed. Their task was to gather information for the 
committees of departmental managers and they obviously possessed no decision-making 
powers. 
Departmental 
Departmental 
project players
Project 
Manager
Departmental 
project 
supervisors
Contributors from 
outside the company 
(industrial market 
partners)
Project Manager's 
scope
  
management
Project committees
 
Figure 2: The Project Coordination Structure 
 (adapted from Clark, Hayes and Wheelwright, 1988) 
 
Project control techniques were implemented at that time. A general standard product 
development planning was set to coordinate the different contributions. A common economic 
language based on the project Return On Investment [Taux de Rendement Interne] concept 
was defined, to arbitrate trade-offs between the various corporate departments. 
In this first step of "projectification" of the firm, the processes involved only the top of the 
firm. Its focus was essentially to manage the project portfolio in a way that would be coherent 
with the global strategy of the firm. Another important point is that the projects have no 
champion to enforce their identity and negociate with the strategies of the skill-based 
departments. The project is a result, a compromise between existing professional goals and 
methodologies. Finally, this phase is oriented towards implementation of the standard Project 
Management tools: planning, budgeting and the ROI criterion.  
In the middle of the 1980's, this Project Coordination System failed to meet Renault's 
increasing ambitions in terms of time, quality and cost control of the projects (Midler 1993a p 
99). Matching the skill-based department strategies and contributions without a powerful 
coordinator was a particularly difficult and little effective process. In the same time, 
international comparison revealed more generally occidental project management practices to 
be far less competitive than Japanese automobile product development processes (Clark et al 
1987). 
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Third Phase: Empowerment and Autonomy of the Project Management Structure in 
1989 
 
 
These facts were already known by 1986-1987. But Renault was then in an important crisis 
and all concerns and energies were focussed on short term programs in order to improve the 
financial situation of the firm. Developing project management performance was not a 
priority in that context. As soon as short term profitability objectives were met, the new CEO, 
Raymond H. Lévy introduced in December 1988 a reform creating Project Directors. 
 
This change was essentially a political move: The innovation was not in the project 
management structure (it existed since the early 1970's) nor in a new methodology but in the 
power and autonomy given to this role. Project managers have now a powerful formal 
position in the firm, giving the project strong enough status to carry on an equally-matched 
dialogue with top departmental echelons. The project management role was entrusted to 
experienced and successful executive personnel, with much influence capacities due to their 
prestige and know-how. The project structure surrounding the Project Director was also 
developed to a complete team of departmental project supervisors (products, engineering, 
industrial production, purchasing, sales, quality, planning controler, economic controler, 
personnel relations) with one foot in each hierarchy and operating within a matrix-type model 
(Galbraith, 1971). Figure 3 illustrates such a Project Director organizational form. 
 
Departmental 
Departmental 
project players
Project 
Manager
Departmental 
project 
supervisors
Contributors from 
outside the company 
(industrial market 
partners)
Project Manager's 
scope
  
management
 
Figure 3: The Project Director Structure 
 (adapted from Clark, Hayes and Wheelwright, 1988) 
 
Characterization of the Project Management Practices  
 
 
This structural change is only the most visible part of the changing process; the part that was 
much studied after Chandler presented his famous theory of adjustment of structure to 
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strategy (1962). Organizational change analysis needs also to focus on practices, behaviours 
and know-how within the formal patterns. The development of a new car involves more than 
a thousand professionals, hundreds of different firms. These complexe cooperative processes 
cannot be changed in an instant by the creation of a new project structure. Therefore, after the 
structural change in December 1988 began a experimental period for project management 
within Renault, to try to turn the new autonomy into effective practices for development of 
the new products. The first project of this third phase was the Twingo project which began in 
january 1989. We had the opportunity of studying it with a real-time observation 
methodology from its beginning to its end. This research followed another one, were we had 
made an ex-post analysis of a project of the beginning of the 1980s, ruled in the coordination 
project manager form.  
The conclusions of that research (Midler 1993a) can be interpreted in Argyris and Schön 
terms of level of learning (Argyris and Schön 1978). The transition from phase one to phase 
two was a single loop learning process: A better coordination in a stable frame of reference. 
But the transition from the second phase to the third must be seen as a double loop learning 
process. We have pointed out five instances as radical changes in the "theories in use" of the 
firm concerning the product development processes. 
 
The Global and Entrepreneurial Responsability of the Project Role 
 
The first deep change lies in the definition of project roles. The job is defined by a result 
responsability on a global goal, the success of the future car, without mentioning required 
skills, expertise or methodology.  It is an entrepreneurial job definition, with a great 
autonomy on the means to achieve the target, as projects managers in the precedent phase 
were characterized as applicant of the standard development procedures of the firm.  
 
The Twingo project was a spectacular experiment to demonstrate how such autonomy could 
be used to create the organizational context that could drive all energies and concerns to the 
very key problems of a specific project. 
One important point about this project, a little innovative urban car, was the economic 
constraint. Many other similar project had already failed at Renault since 1973 on that 
criteria. Therefore, the project team generalised a "design to cost" methodology which 
reversed the classical development process. The development process was initiated on the 
base of volontarist economic targets for each sub-system of the car and piece of the 
manufacturing system, targets which were consistent with the global objective of the 
program. Then, the devopment went on to find technical solutions to fit these initial economic 
constraints.  
Such a process was found to be particularly efficient (see Midler, 1993a, p26-33). It led to 
significative changes in the manufacturing process (the first technology scenarios included a 
high degree of sophisticated and expensive automation, the design-to-cost operation leading 
to a 30% cut in the body shop investment for example) as on basic components as important 
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as the motor (the investment cost of the motor finally chosen for the Twingo was less than 
half of the investment needed with the first motor proposition made by the motor engineers of 
the firm). On the sales side, the work done by project management led to innovations in 
distribution modes and in communications; these in turn led to major savings in program 
costs. 
 
The Importance of Singularities in Projects 
 
The classical industrial rationality is in a certain way a general attempt to escape from the 
singularities of particular situations. Professionnal identities are definied on typified 
problems. They implement standard operating procedures (Cyert and March 1963). They 
introduce "buffers" and rules to disconnect these logics from outside contingencies 
(Thompson 1967).  
 
But singularities are key points for projects, these "one shot" adventures which cannot be cut 
from their specific context. Empowered project managers are therefore constant advocates for 
tailor-made methodologies and solutions for the particular problems of their project. A lot of 
decision on the Twingo project can be interpreted as a effort to make the most of the 
pecularities of the product : the innovative concept and design of the car, the simplicity of an 
undiversified product, etc... One exemple of such a decision was the modification of the 
planning of the project to meet the opportunity of a presentation of the car at the "Mondial de 
l'Automobile" in Paris in October of 1992.  
 
Systematization of Horizontal Communication between Professionnals 
 
In the second phase of Renault "projectification" process, cross-professionnal dialogue was 
limited to the top of the firm. In the third phase cross-professionnal communication had been 
generalised to the bottom of the firm, in order to anticipate possible problems as to improve 
the trade-offs between the various logical systems involved.  
This horizontal coordination was implemented in the project scheduling. Formerly, the work 
of the various experts was performed sequentially, starting with marketing and design, going 
on to engineering, production methods, materials purchasing and serial production and 
ending up with sales. On the Twingo project, contributors traditionally playing "downstream" 
roles (plant personnel, outside suppliers, sales personnel) were involved right from the 
beginning.  
The cross-professional communication was also concretized by physically gathering together 
a large proportion of expert personnel in the same location — known as the "project 
platform" [plateau du projet in French] — with the physical media and tools for development 
near at hand. Formerly, workers on a project stayed where their departments were physically 
located, which often meant that they were far apart. Physical proximity therefore enabled 
time measured in weeks to be saved in solving interface problems, in particular the 
management of modifications dictated by industrial feasibility. 
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Finally, a new project guidance structure was set up with the goal of decentralizing the 
control of costs, schedules and quality risks out to those contributing directly to project 
development. To achieve this, the project was broken down into some two dozen sub-projects 
based on physical sub-assemblies or specific client services (automobile noise and behavior 
studies for instance). In each of these sub-projects, a group was formed to represent each of 
the skills involved: engineering, methods, purchasing, outside suppliers, industrial production 
etc. This decentralization made it possible to mobilize effectively the project players involved 
at ground level to achieve project objectives and make major improvements in the quality of 
the decisions reached. Members of the project team ensured the overall coherence of the 
work done by the various sub-groups. 
 
Project Temporality and Convergence Logic 
 
One of the major changes implied by the development processes introduced by project teams 
was to bind the corporation to a specific temporal progression, a progression defined by the 
project itself. In traditional development processes each department contributes to the overall 
project at a given point in the sequence, working toward a limited horizon. Now all 
contributors work within a common time frame (Sayles and Chandler 1971), which we have 
modelled in a diagram represented in Figure 4 (Midler 1993a, p 98). 
Degree of freedom of 
maneuver in project
Level of product 
knowledge 
Time 
axis  
Figure 4: Project Convergence (from Midler, 1993) 
 
In this model, a project is represented by two connected processes: A learning process (dotted 
line) in which uncertainty about product features, industrial feasibility and market reception 
is gradually reduced, and a work process (solid line) in which the freedom to change the 
project is gradually reduced as the degree of irreversibility of project decisions rises. Project 
management has to control these coupled processes from the upstream initiation phase, where 
virtually anything is possible — but where nothing is actually known for sure — to the phase 
downstream when everything is known, but virtually no free choices remain. 
The anticipation strategies in the modern concurrent engineering approach can be visualised 
as in figure 5. In a first phase, project managers try to prevent early commitment in heavy 
irreversible decisions in the same time as they try to gather as much information as possible 
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on the project. On a second phase, the project is locked as precisely and exhaustively as 
possible, for modern industrial systems are so integrated that their different variables are 
closely dependant. Finally, at the end of the project speed and rapid reaction are given 
maximum priority in order to expedite the finding of solutions to the remaining technical 
obstacles.  
 
Rapid Convergence
Slow Convergence
Degree of freedom of 
maneuver in project
Level of product 
knowledge 
Time 
axis
 
 
Figure 5: Accelerating the project cycle 
 
This focus-down convergence logic leads to joint continuity and rapid adaptation in 
management styles on the project (Midler, 1993b). On one hand, learning needs memory 
process in the project team. If those involved at the end of the process were not there at the 
beginning, there is a strong likelihood that they will have no understanding of the 
compromises and trade-offs negotiated by others. They will not accurately assess the risks 
taken by others in full awareness of the context, and there is even a risk that they will not feel 
personally bound by commitments entered into by others. But on the other hand, the 
management capacities needed at each phase are very different : the emerging phase needs 
strategic insights, creativity and charisma, a capacity to sustain high uncertainty contexts; the 
control phase requires precision, realism and negociation talents; the last phase is a 
permanent race against time, where remaining "details" can stop the process if they are not 
taken care of rapidly and where the project team have to undergo a very conflictual context.  
 
The Twingo project was typical of such a focus-down convergence logic. When the project 
team was formed, no decision had been taken to go ahead with the project. At that time it still 
seemed impossibly risky in economic terms : 15% reduction in variable costs and 25% in 
investment were needed to meet the ROI target. Project managers then capitalized on the risk 
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of abandonment of the project to look at any route which had not really been explored up to 
that time. Studies went on for more than a year before the decision to build the automobile 
was finally taken, based on satisfying data. When this point of no return had been reached, it 
went into a second "control" phase in which maximum stabilization was sought for all 
development parameters. Finally, at the end of the project speed and rapid reaction were 
given maximum priority in order to expedite the finding of solutions to the remaining 
technical obstacles. The final result were consistant with the commitment taken at the point of 
no return (Midler, 1993a, p50-51). 
 
 
Partnership Development 
 
The introduction of concurrent engineering principles into relationships with suppliers took 
the form of co-development processes. Early selection of suppliers was carried out using 
contract specifications which were sufficiently open to enable suppliers to help in the search 
for solutions. The Project Manager polled equipment suppliers as early as the beginning of 
1989 using component price targets as a basis. The technical solutions they submitted in 
response were then negotiated with engineering design personnel following a route which is 
exactly the opposite of what is normal; that is, purchasing personnel normally use detailed 
and unchangeable technical specifications to call for competitive bids from suppliers, the goal 
being to arrive at the best possible price (see Womack et al 1990). 
Following this, the chosen equipment suppliers were closely integrated into the project 
development teams working inside the company in order to make quality cost and time 
savings in dealing with the many questions related to the interfacing of the areas for which 
suppliers were responsible with closely connected or interdependent project areas. 
The implementation of these new procedures was to have a dramatic effect on the Twingo 
project: it enabled a reduction in costs of 18% to be made on the components in the design-to-
cost program (compared with initial estimates made by project costing personnel). 
Reductions on certain components even reached 30% without affecting either quality or profit 
margin, simply by better targeting of specifications following a complete functional analysis 
of the product. 
The project management teams made major contributions to this evolution since their 
responsibilities cut right across boundaries between the corporation and the outside world: 
they spoke for instance in terms of "internal" and "external" suppliers, placing Renault plants 
and the facilities of Renault suppliers in a peer-to-peer relationship; they helped promote 
competition between engineering design personnel within Renault and like departments in 
outside equipment supply firms with the objective of widening the search for technical 
solutions, and so on. Purchasing personnel were naturally right at the heart of this revolution 
in the relationship between the corporation and its partners, a fact which implied an updating 
of both its supplier relations and its contacts with internal technical personnel, providing new 
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meanings and new tools for traditional notions such as supplier quotation requests, selection 
and monitoring. 
 
 
The Forth Phase of Renault's Projectification: Transforming the Permanent Processes 
of the Firm 
 
 
Above-mentioned organizations and project management principles are now implemented on 
every new project within Renault. But yet, it is not the end of Renault's "projectification" 
process. A number of problems still remain. Professionals trained for years in a 
compartmentalized corporate environment have not been prepared for inter-department, or 
even inter-company, dialogue. Empowerment and growth of project structures lead to 
classical but important questions: what is the future for skill-based functional departments of 
the firm ? Are they going to disappear, scattered into different project teams? How is it 
possible to keep the long-term technical learning process, when organizational structures 
focusses energies on more short-term and product oriented objectives?  
 
What therefore is the future route of the improvement process in project performances? There 
seem today to be two likely candidates. 
- The first candidate is to continue to reinforce the importance of project structures. If this 
was to happen, there would be increasing development in size and responsability of project 
teams, skilled-based departments becoming simply labor pools on which project managers 
could draw. 
- The route down which Renault has gone — the second candidate — is not this one. Renault 
has chosen to balance out strong project identities and strong departmental identities, setting 
up a complementary relationship between the two. As the project logic, the logic specific to 
technical skill departments cannot be ignored in the context of the automobile industry: 
maintaining and developing a sales network, increasing the productivity of a multi-product 
fabrication system and the level of the technical skills of engineering design personnel are 
objectives which are just as crucial as the success of any project. The raw material of future 
projects depends on the development of departmental expertise. It therefore seems to be a 
more efficient solution to strengthen the two complementary identities and to enhance the 
cooperation between them. 
Against this background, the developments now to be expected are no longer so much in 
relation to project team management or even at the project/department interface. Rather, 
further "projectification" will occur in learning and internal reorganizing of corporate 
departments or supplier companies. 
 
Changes in the Technical Skills within Corporate Departments 
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The Taylor type work division has had the effect of making some personnel specialize 
upstream and others downstream in a linear process. The "upstream culture" thus became 
habituated to abstraction, developing the capability for strategic reasoning (in other words, 
defining scenarios and constraints in situations with high levels of freedom of maneuver). 
"Downstream culture" became reactive in outlook (capable of reacting in situations in which 
freedom is restricted but uncertainty comparatively low), aware of the importance of detail, of 
the approximate character of both forecasts and theoretical presentations, and habituated to 
pragmatic reasoning. 
Putting these two corporate cultures, as different as they are complementary, together in a 
context of concurrent engineering without any preparation cannot be immediately effective. 
The dialogue between very different departmental skill areas requires that each must show a 
higher capability for rationalization than in communicating with players on their own team. 
This requires suitable communication tools to be developed. How can it be possible, for 
example, to have meaningful discussions on the industrial feasibility of a component with 
only drawings as reference? New modes of individual knowledge and team action, in addition 
to new media for communication between skill-based departments, need therefore to be 
invented. 
A further major change is the integration of technical skills and value-control expertise: in 
other words — controlling costs, scheduling and quality. The process whereby work was 
divided up led previously to a sharp separation of these two types of competences, which was 
harmful to projects. What a project manager wants a technician to do, for instance, is to fit his 
technical decisions to quality and cost targets, to work not toward technical sophistication for 
its own sake, but toward the final success of the project as a whole. 
The final project debriefings operated as revealing the degree of expertise and relevance of 
skilled-based departments and pointed out the need for developping new knowledges. One 
spectacular evolution within Renault is the recent decision to merge the product engineering 
department and the process engineering department under same location and responsability, 
in order to develop technical knowledge combining product and process expertises. Another 
area for deep professional reorientation is the purchasing departments. New co-development 
strategies with suppliers necessitates new ways to evaluate, select and coordinate the 
suppliers, compared to the classical buying practices. Reengineering of buying departments is 
currently one of the main field of transformation, and it is not by chance that the new Director 
just appointed this year for conducting this transition is an outgoing Project Director. 
 
Changes in the Relationship between Departmental Management Echelons 
 
If horizontally-based project groups, bringing together personnel from workshops, 
engineering offices, purchasing departments and so on, are to function properly, those who 
take part in them need sufficient levels of competence and decision-making power, and they 
particularly need to be able to undertake negotiations which will commit their departments 
(and therefore the managers of those departments). 
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This is incompatible with the Taylorian type of organization in which delegation is unheard 
of and in which competence is strictly divided between high-echelon experts and those who 
carry out the orders. Such organizational principles are still frequently encountered, and not 
only in industrial plants. 
 
Changes in Tools for Assessing Departmental Performance 
 
The standards by which the performance of project contributors is assessed also need to be 
reinvented; it is an illusion to think that project players will seek to optimize global project 
criteria if they are themselves assessed in isolation on criteria only partly related to their 
work. The upstream involvement of plants in the project is a typical example of this: the 
evaluation of the performance of individual plants is arrived at essentially on the basis of the 
ratio of the number of plant personnel to the number of automobiles produced. The 
involvement of workshop foremen or technicians prior to the launch of a new model, hiring 
and training the manufacturing team six months to a year before serial production — none of 
this is reflected immediately in any productivity indicator. This explains why it is so difficult 
to mobilize high levels of energy just at the moment when it would be most effective for the 
final design of facilities and the preparation of the teams involved. 
 
Changes in Relative Status between Different Functions 
 
In Western technically advanced corporations as automobile firms, upstream technical and 
strategic departments used to be in a dominating position (a push forward hierarchy). 
Concurrent engineering and project managers concern about global compromise on the 
project tend to change this relationship between the different functions of the firm (towards a 
more "pull" hierarchy). It gives downstream people new opportunities to express and enforce 
their constraints and value adding rationality. 
 
Changes in Career Management within Permanent Structures 
 
Projects are historic and temporary activities. One difficult problem is to match the 
continuous but temporary involvment in the project teams with the career management 
constraints in the permanent structures. We already saw how people rotation had 
dysfunctional effects on project convergence. But this rotation is generally the direct 
consequence of rational allocating of scarce expertise among different projects. Team 
dismantling at the end of a development is also a difficult problem: Permanent structures or 
new projects rarely open satisfactory job opportunities at the right moment. 
 
Changes in the System of Industrial Equipment Supply and the Professionalism of Corporate 
Buyers 
 
The traditional attitude of the corporate buyer is to seek out the cheapest sub-contractor to 
make a component carefully defined by drawings and specifications. The result of this is a 
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fragmentation of sub-contact work: taking stamping as an example, there are sub-contractors 
supplying serial production tooling, others for the first wave of prototypes, and yet others for 
second wave. The cheapest suppliers are often those who have made the greatest reductions 
in their overheads — and, by the same token, in their design costs. Modern project managers 
challenge the worth of this kind of narrow specialization. They are looking for partners 
capable of undertaking an entire development process from the first prototypes right through 
to serial production, with the objective of anticipating as early as possible the constraints 
which will exist for industrial-scale manufacture and ensuring the lessons learned upstream 
will be remembered downstream. It will readily be understood that this implies fundamental 
changes in the way in which equipment suppliers are organized (Banville and Chanaron, 
1991). 
 
 
 
Conclusions for research. 
 
 
We shall conclude our analysis of the Renault journey towards project orientation by 
emphazing two points which draw perspectives for futur researches. 
 
The first one concerns the relation between the development of temporary organizations (as 
project teams) and the permanent structures and processes within firms, or more generally 
society. The relationship between temporary and permanent organizations is classically 
analysed in a "zero sum game" frame: the question is to find a good compromise between 
autonomy of temporary organization versus control from permanent logics of the firm. Our 
findings show that this autonomy/control dilemna is an intermediary step in the 
projectification process. Beyond that point, temporary organizations does not need less 
powerfull stable social logics but different  ones. Our conclusion is that an important research 
question in the future is the evolution of the knowledge-oriented permanent organizations (or 
institutions) coupled with temporary product oriented organizations. Similar results and 
perspectives can be found at a more macro-level level : specific long term stable social 
identities or relationship can be positive factors to support the mobility, uncertainty and stress 
of temporary adventures of innovation projects (see for instance the analysis of the role of 
institutions in the construction sector by Eccles, 1981). 
 
The second theoretical issue is the learning processes underlying Renault's "projectification". 
Analysing Japanese firms, Nonaka (1994, p 27-32) proposed a typology of three models for 
managing the organizational knowledge creation process : Top-down, Middle-Up-Down and 
Bottom-Up. Our analysis shows how these different models may be associated in a long term 
transition, as in Renault 30 years projectification. First move in the early 1970's is typical of 
Top-down logic. Creation of Project Directors at the end of the 1980's inaugurated a Middle-
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Up-Down logic : to generate "creative chaos", by emphasing product development 
performance as a strategic problem for the firm, and creating new actors and situations 
(global scope of responsability on a product development) ; to generate involvement and 
autonomy as conditions to initiate knowledge creation processes in this situation ; key role of 
middle management in the knowledge conversion processes between tacit and explicit 
knowledge (Nonaka, 1994, p 18-19). Our final comment will be on the implications of such a 
knowledge creation theory on management research methodology. Different French 
management and organization research centers have developped since the 1970's longitudinal 
research methodologies, as demonstrated in our research with Renault on "projectification". 
Such collaborations, which were exceptional and difficult to arrange in the 1970's, are since 
the mid-eighties more and more favoured in France, both by professionals and scientific 
authorities. We propose to interpret this recent development as a result of the growing 
importance of learning in the "grounded theories" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) among 
professionals as much as the impact of the traditional methodological debates within the 
scientific community. 
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